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I. INTRODUCTION
The modern American practice of awarding punitive damages
in the context of a civil trial is unique among developed legal
systems around the world. Traces of the practice still exist in
other common law nations, such as Canada and Australia.
Certain European nations, namely France, have begun
introducing exemplary damages into their civil code. But the
practice of allowing private citizens to use the courts to punish
other private citizens for acting in ways not necessarily proven to
be criminal is pervasive and important only in the American
legal system.
A jurisprudence of punitive damages could encompass a
range of questions. It could ask, most generally, about the
rationale or justification for punitive damages. It might ask,
substantively: What conduct warrants civil punishment? It
might ask, procedurally: Who decides whether punitive damages
ought to be awarded and how should that decision be made?
Interestingly, most of the academic scholarship in the United
States has focused on the last question.
Why should this be? It is not the case that law reviews lack
articles on punitive damages theory. There are also some judicial
opinions that examine the substantive ground for punitive
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N . Cardozo School of Law.
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damages awards. For example, National By-Products, Inc. u.
Searcy House Moving Co. is a 1987 Arkansas Supreme Court
decision that considers the question of whether driving a truck
downhill at seventy miles per hour with the intent to cross a
single-lane bridge designed to accommodate two-way traffic was
wanton, therefore permitting a jury to award punitive damages
to the plaintiff.1 I think the court arrived at the wrong resultthat the conduct could not be considered wanton2-.but at least
the case engages the substantive ground for a punitive damages
award at a reasonably detailed level.
National By-Products is the exception. Most of the leading
punitive damages cases are discussed by scholars and the
practicing bar with two procedural restrictions: (1) the sort of
evidence that a factfinder can hear when deciding the scale of
punitive damages, or (2) whether a court should review the
factfinder's decision about how much to award in punitive
damages with a defeasible assumption that the punitive damages
awards should not exceed the underlying compensatory award by
a certain known and fixed ratio. The reason for this, I believe, is
that these are the questions that the United States Supreme
Court has asked about punitive damages over the past twenty
years-and the Supreme Court's choice of focus is very
influential.
In this short essay, I want to illustrate the pitfalls of the
focus on process over substance by examining the quick rise and
fall of the "putative ratio rule" announced by the Supreme Court
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. a
II. THE ORIGINS OF "THE RATIO"
As many courts and scholars have noted, the history of
punitive damages reflects a multitude of rationales and purposes
for punitive damages in both England and the United States. 4
1. Nat'l By-Products, Inc. v. Searcy House Moving Co. , 731 S.W.2d 194
(Ark. 1987).
2. Id. at 195.
3. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
4. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?
Why
Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-
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Generally speaking, punitive damages have been justified for
their retributive, deterrent, and expressive functions. How a
court might address these justifications would inform its
conclusion with regard to questions concerning the substantive
law of punitive damages-for example, whether punitive
damages could be awarded against a master for the actions of his
servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or whether
punitive damages could be awarded against an intoxicated
motorist. It is only quite recently, however, that courts and
commentators have been concerned exclusively with the size of a
punitive damages award, as opposed to its underlying rationale
or justification.
The concern over scale (as opposed to rationale) is traceable
back to Judge Friendly's perceptive analysis in Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. of the (then) new problems raised by
allowing punitiv~ damages in mass tort cases.5 Judge Friendly's
ultimate concern was that multiple punitive damages awards for
the same wrong would lead to "over-punishment"--offending our
sense of fairness-and might have the practical effect of "overdeterring" socially desirable conduct.6
Since Roginsky, there has been a concerted effort on the part
of those concerned with the growth of punitive damages to limit
scale by means of some fixed "hard" cap. The most common
expression of this effort has been the adoption of legislative caps
on damages, especially in medical malpractice litigation.7 The
other expression of this effort has been to try to convince courts
that punitive damages should be tethered to a fixed ratio, similar
to the 3: 1 ratio found in antitrust and racketeering statutes. In
an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants in the 1992 case TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., s the American Tort

KENT L. REV. 163 (2003).
5. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir.
1967) (reversing punitive damages award in products liability action against
manufacturer of anti-cholesterol drug) .
6. Id. at 838-42.
7. Nancy L. Zisk, Limitations of Legislatively Imposed Damages Caps:
Proposing a Better Way to Control the Costs of Medical Malpractice, 30 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 119, 122-23 (2007).
8. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S . 443 (1993).
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Reform Association suggested that "there is much merit" to a
rule that would hold any punitive damages award presumptively
excessive if it exceeded a "prescribed multiple" of compensatory
damages.9
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument that due process required "objective" criteria and,
taking into account the potential harm that the defendant's
actions could have caused the plaintiff, approved a punitive
damages award that was 526 times the actual compensatory
damages awarded by the jury.10
Even in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,11 the first
Supreme Court case rejecting a punitive damages award for
excessiveness, ratio played an ambiguous role. In BMW the court
set out a three-part test for evaluating constitutional
excessiveness: (1) a punitive damages award had to bear some
reasonable relationship to the reprehensibility of the underlying
act; (2) there had to be a reasonable relationship between the
amount of the compensatory damages and the punitive damages;
and (3) the punitive damages award could not be too "much in
excess" of the comparable penalties that the state would impose
for the same act. 12 It was not until 2003, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,13 that a true hard cap
ratio rule emerged from the Supreme Court. The State Farm
case arose after the plaintiff had caused a fatal multi-car
accident. The plaintiffs insurer, State Farm, refused to settle for
the $50,000 policy limit. After the plaintiff was found liable in
excess of his policy limit, he brought suit against State Farm
alleging bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Although State Farm ultimately paid the full amount of
the judgment against the plaintiff, a jury nevertheless awarded
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in
punitive damages in his suit against State Farm. In reversing
the Utah courts, the Supreme Court opined that "few awards
9. Brief for the American Tort Reform Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at *33, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993) (No. 92-479) (LEXIS, 1992 U.S. Briefs 479).
10. TXO, 509 U.S. at 453, 457.
11. BMW ofN. Am. , Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 560 (1995).
12. See id. at 574-85.
13. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages .. . will satisfy due process." 14 This has been taken by
many commentators as a de facto cap on punitive damages by a
"single-digit" ratio. 15
III. THE FATE OF THE RATIO
The Supreme Court decided against reaffirming the singledigit ratio in Philip Morris v. Williams.16 In Philip Morris, the
plaintiffs estate sued for the wrongful death of a smoker and won
an $821,000 compensatory damages award and a $79.5 million
punitive damages award.17 The Supreme Court reversed the
punitive damages in this case, but not because the ratio between
the compensatory award and the punitive damages award was
constitutionally excessive. It reversed it on completely separate
grounds relating to the possibility that the trial judge's
instructions impermissibly allowed the jury to punish the
defendant tobacco company for having caused death and injury to
smokers in the state where the plaintiff lived.is The Court did
not discuss whether the award was constitutionally suspect
because of the ratio between the compensatory and punitive
award, which exceeded single digits by a very large degree. More
ominously, the decision to reverse was 5-4, with Justice Stevens
(the author of BMW) voting to affirm the $79.5 million punitive
damages award. This result leaves one to wonder whether the
ratio prong in the test that he devised possessed much force in
cases involving conscious indifference to human life-a factor
which played a large role in the reasoning of the lower state

14. Id. at 425.
15. A typical example of the way State Farm has been received is
evidenced in a report published by the law firm Wilson Elser Moskowitz
Edelman & Dicker LLP in 2006: "It appears that courts generally are adhering
to the single-digit multiplier mandate set forth by the Supreme Court in State
Farm u. Campbell . . . ."
Punitive Damages Review 2006 at viii,
(http://www.travelers.com/businessinsurance/excessCasualty/docs/PunitiveDam
ages.pd.f).
16. Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) .
17. Id. at 1061.
18. Id. at 1063.
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courts that upheld the award.19
It is possible to take the Supreme Court at face value and to
assume that they approached the problem of punitive damages in
Philip Morris with the goal of deciding the case on the narrowest
grounds possible. Even if it were possible for the Court to
adequately adjudicate the case by using only some of the tests
previously developed, it is not clear why it would want to do so.
The practicing bar interpreted State Farm to set a hard cap.
Numerous state courts took this as the message of State Farm,
even in personal injury cases.20 One might think that the
Supreme Court would take the opportunity to employ a test that
it had so recently developed.
One reason why the Court avoided the ratio rule in Philip
Morris might be, as suggested above, that at least one Justice
who voted in State Farm had second thoughts about the
durability or strength of the rule, at least when it came to
extremely culpable conduct in the context of personal injury
litigation. Another reason might be that the Court is beginning
to realize that the rule is not really worth defending. One of the
most notable features of punitive damages in state and lower
federal courts is how malleable the compensatory damages figure
is in the hands of a judge intent on producing a ratio that stays
within the magic single-digit field.
For example, in just one case in the Third Circuit, the district ,
court21 and the Court of Appeals22 found that a $2006
compensatory damages award and a $150,000 punitive damages
award in a bad faith insurance claim bore a "single-digit" ratio to
one another. In Willow Inn, Inc. v. Public Service Mutual
Insurance Co., the court looked at the potential harm that could
have been suffered by the plaintiff had it not spent money to
enforce its claim in the face of the bad-faith denial of its
19. Id. at 1060-65. Justice Stevens voted with the majority in State Farm
as well. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) .
20. See, e.g., Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 798-99 (Ct. App.
2003).
21. Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-5481, 2003
WL 21321370 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
22. Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224 (3d Cir.
2005).
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insurance coverage.23 The court argued that the $150,000
punitive damages award ought to be compared to the potential
loss of $125,000, for a ratio close to 1:1. On appeal, the Third
Circuit rejected this reasoning, holding instead that the proper
comparison of the $150,000 punitive damages award was with
the legal fees paid by the plaintiff to enforce its rights, which
totaled close to $135,000, also for a ratio of 1:1. 24 Other courts
have come up with equally creative accounting tricks. In Seltzer
v. Morton, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the contention
that the ratio required by State Farm required a comparison of
the punitive damages award with the compensatory award. 25
The court held instead that the proper comparison was with the
company's net worth.26 Despite ultimately overturning the
punitive damages award of $20 million in a case involving a $1.1
million compensatory award, it insisted on comparing the
punitive damages award with the figure of $260 million.21
IV. CONCLUSION

It is not clear what purpose or value the ratio rule has at this
point. The rule itself has very shallow roots in the history of
punitive damages jurisprudence. It is easy to manipulate and
does not really provide greater certainty or much of a constraint
on a creative judge. It was not defended by the Supreme Court in
a case where it could have been invoked easily and crisply.
Despite the superficial attraction of the rule, which promised the
same swift effects of a legislative cap without the legislation, it
seems that the Supreme Court has chosen not to expend its
capital defending it. Unless the court chooses to bring it up
again in a decision of importance, it is very likely that the ratio
rule will be abandoned by the courts, to the point where they will
not even need to invent fictions to justify ratios higher than

23. Willow Inn, No. CIV.A. 00-5481, 2003 WL 21321370 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
24. Willow Inn, 399 F.3d at 235; see also Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont'l
Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (including attorney fees as
actual damages in ration calculation).
25. Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 611 (Mont. 2007).
26. Id. at 597-98.
27. Id. at 612-14.

293

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 2

single-digits.
V.

AFTERWORD

On January 31, 2008, the Oregon Supreme Court issued
its opinion in the remand of Williams u. Philip Morris Inc. 2s The
Oregon Supreme Court upheld the original jury verdict of $79.5
in punitive damages.29 There was every reason to believe that
after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Philip Morris , the
Oregon Supreme Court would remand the case to the trial court
for a new trial for damages. It would have been less likely to
have ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages as did the
Alabama Supreme Court after reversal and remand by the
United States Supreme Court in BMW.30 BMW, however, unlike
State Farm , did not pretend to erect a numerical hard cap. It is
interesting to note that the Alabama Supreme Court applied the
U.S. Supreme Court's three guideposts (plus its own state law
guideposts) in awarding an amount which was greater than ten
times the compensatory damages awarded ($50,000 v. $4,000).31
In any event, the Oregon Supreme Court followed a very
different path. It held that that the jury verdict should not be
disturbed, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's
endorsement of Philip Morris's arguments that the jury
instructions adopted by the trial judge were sufficiently
constitutionally suspect and that the jury's award likely violated
the due process rights of the defendant.
Rather, the Oregon Supreme Court's argument was based
on the uncontroversial point that a state court decision should
28. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 9705-03957, 2008 WL 256614 (Or.
Jan. 31, 2008). Since this decision was issued shortly before the publication of
this article, this Afterword was written after Sections I-IV of this article were
submitted to this law review for publication.
29. The unadjusted compensatory damages award was $821 ,485.50.
Williams , 2008 WL 256614 at *9.
30. After the U.S. Supreme Court held that the $2 million punitive
damages was constitutionally excessive the Alabama Supreme Court remanded
to the trial court with orders to offer the plaintiff a choice between accepting a
reduction of the punitive damages award to $50,000 or to submit to a new trial
on damages. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997).
31. Id.

294

2008]

"Single-Digit" Ratio

not be disturbed if, notwithstanding its violation of the federal
constitution, there are independent and adequate state grounds
to uphold the decision.32 In this case, the independent and
adequate state grounds are that the instructions requested by
Philip Morris at trial violated Oregon law.ss This is an issue that
the U.S. Supreme Court did not take up in Philip Morris, and one
over which they have neither jurisdiction nor competency.
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court was not only reviewing
the jury instructions requested by Philip Morris, it was also
reviewing the jury instructions that the trial judge actually gave.
One cannot help but think that the Supreme Court thought that
it was holding that the instructions that were given were
unconstitutional. To be fair, the majority opinion in Philip
Morris is not as clear as it might have been on this point.
Because of the posture of the appeal from the lower court-a
point that will be discussed further below-the Supreme Court
chose to discuss the Oregon's Supreme Court's rejection of Philip
Morris's argument.3 4 The Supreme Court explicitly weighed the
reasons the Oregon Supreme Court gave; those reasons said
nothing about independent and adequate state grounds. Instead,
the Oregon Supreme Court stated that the due process clause
allowed the punishment of Philip Morris for acts that it had done
to non-parties. Since the instructions given to the jury were
based on this position, it is difficult to see how a rejection of the
Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning was thus not also a
declaration by the U.S. Supreme Court that the instructions
violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In the January 21, 2008 remand opinion, the Oregon
Supreme Court did not actually deny that the U.S. Supreme
Court said that the instructions that were given to the jury were
unconstitutional. Its view is that this conclusion is mere dicta,

32. Williams, 2008 WL 256614 at *5 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 123 (1990).
33. Williams, 2008 WL 256614 at *6, *9.
34. See, e.g., "The instruction that Philip Morris said the trial court should
have given ...." Id. at *5 (quoting Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at
1064) (emphasis added).
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since that issue was not before the court.35 It should be obvious
that this reading of Philip Morris, even if technically correct, is
extremely formalistic and will probably come as a surprise to
virtually everyone connected with the case, including the
Supreme Court Justices who struggled to answer a question
which the Oregon Supreme Court now reveals was moot all
along. But taking it at face value, does the latest move by the
Oregon Supreme Court have any significance for the question
posed by this article?
The short answer is: no. The question posed by Philip
Morris is whether the "hard cap" proposed by the Supreme Court
in State Farm means what it seemed to say. Regardless of which
jury instructions the jury should have received, its verdict-$79.5
million dollars in punitive damages-could have been seen by the
Supreme Court to have violated the single-digit ratio indicated
by State Farm. The Supreme Court's choice not to invalidate the
award on those grounds is significant because, according to the
Oregon Supreme Court, the question decided by the Supreme
Court was not part of the defendant's latest appeal in the state
courts. The explicit refusal by the Court to entertain the ratio
question is doubly significant, since now it seems that it was the
only federal question properly raised by Philip Morris.

35. "Defendant did not preserve any issue as to the instructions that the
trial court did give." Williams, 2008 WL 256614 at *5 n.3 (emphasis added).
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